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By Liczit.-ColoiieZ E. 111. LLOYI;), A.E. (Retired). 
H E R E  is no battle in which the fighting quality of British 
infantry, antl their ability to pull thcir gcncrd out of a hole, is 
better shown than that of Albucra, and there is none mhich 
has bccn described in morq gloiving and soul-stirring language. Ilut the 
artistic csccllencc of Napicr’s picture impairs to some extent its scientific 
usefulness, antl when we study the battle for the sake of the light it 
t h r o w  on the tactical value of linc and column, we feel thc want of those 
cxact and niinutc dctails to which the German histories of the war of 1870 
havc accustomed us. 
Among thc “various opponents” brought into thc ficld by Napicr’s 
outspokenness, Lord Bcresford was the most prominent. He was 
especially sore at Napier’s treatment of him in relation to this battle, and 
a great many particulars about it are to be gleaned from the controversy 
be twxn them.‘ Thc  main question at issue, how much praise or blame 
was duc to Bcresford, is one which it is not worth while now to meddle 
with. But Ileresfortl challenged Napicr’s facts as well as his criticisms, 
and each of them appcalcd to promincnt actors in the  battlc. For those 
who have neither time nor inclination to disintcr long-buried quarrels it 
may be useful to collcct here so much of the evidence brought forward as 
bears upon the main action, and either modifies or supplements Napier’s 
account. 
His description suggcsts bolder features of ground than it actually 
prcsents, for, according to D’Urban, “ it was of gentle undulation and casy 
for cavalry throughout.” And though he  mcntions that the battle lasted 
sis hours, and the scrious fighting four hours, it rcquircs an effort to 
remember this as n.c arc carried along by the impctuosity of his stylc. 
The  strength of the two armies was a much-debated point, and 
cannot be determined with any accuracy. Lord Londonderry (who was 
Wcllington’s Adjutant-General) had put the total of the allies at 27,000 as 
a masimuni.2 Napier put it at more than 32,000, and afterwards thought 
he  had undcrstatcd it. For the present purpose we need only examine 
1 The  following arc the painplilets in which it was carried on :-( t )  ‘‘ Further 
strictures on those parts of Colonel Napicr’s ‘History of the Peninsular War’ which 
relate to the military opinions and conduct of General Lord Viscount Beresford,” 
1S3z. This was anonymous, but Beresford afterwards virtually acknowledged 
himself to be the author. ( 2 )  “Report  of the operations , . . . under Sir 
W. C. Beresford . . . . during the canlpaign of 1811, by Major-Gcneral Sir 
Benjamin DUrban.” This had been written much earlier, but was reprinted as 
a n  appendix to  (I). DUrban had been Quartermaster-General under Beresford, 
and was his chief supporter in the controversy. (3) “Colonel Napier’s justificatiorl 
of his third volume . . . , containing some new and curious facts relative to 
the battle of Albucra,” 1833. (4) “Refutation of Colonel Napier’s justificatiorl of 
his third volume by General Lord Viscount Beresford,” 1834. (5 )  “A letter to 
General Lord Viscount Beresford,” in answer to the above, by Colonel Napier, 
1834. 
2 “Narrative of the Peninsular War,” ii., 131. 































TIIE BATTLE OF A h U E R A .  904 
the strength of the British infantry. Napier speaks of this in one place 
as 6 ,000 ,~  in anather place as not esceeding 7 ,000~ .  In  his Justification 
(p. z I )  he gave as his authority Lord Londonderry’s estimate ofthe British 
as 7,500. But Lord Londonderry says3 that “out of 7,500 British troops 
cnpged, 4,158 were placed hors de and the returns in his 
appendix show that the latter figures included not only the cavalry, but 
the two battalions of the King’s German Legion. The latter numbered 
I , I O O  men, according to Altcn, who commanded them;4 and the British 
cavalry (3rd Dragoon Guards, 4th Dragoons, and 23th Light Dragoons) 
seems to have amounted to at least goo men.s Deducting these, mc have 
only j,500 for the British infantry. Confirmation of this is furnished by 
Napier himself, for he speaks of “1,8oo unwounded men, the remnant of 
6,000 unconquerable British soldiers.” But the loss of the British infantry 
in killed, wounded, and missing was not 4,200 ; it was 3,542 if we take 
rank and file only, or 3,933, including officers. 
As regards the French numbers, Napier stated them as rg,ooo 
infantry and 4,000 cavalry. He afterwards found, in a report from Soult 
to Berthier, 1 2  days before the battle, what he considered to be positive 
evidence that he had overrated them by 1,500 men.G However, he left 
his own figures unchanged in later editions; and they seem as likely to be 
under the mark as over it. 
The allies were inferior to the French both in numbers and weight 
of guns. Out of 38 only 10 (not 18)  were 9-pounders;’ and at the 
dccisivc point they seem to have had only 1 6  guns to oppose 34.’ 
On the morn- 
ing of 16th May the allied army was in position, holding about three 
miles of the ridge which runs north from Almendral, with the Albucra 
rivulet in its front. The second British division (Stewart’s) was in the 
centre (bb’), between the Valverde and Badajoz roads; the Spaniards on 
the right (an‘), and the Portuguese on the left.8 The village of Albuera, 
half-a-mile in front of the right centre, was held as an advanced post. 
Behind it, at b, immediately to the north of the Valverde road, there was a 
Soult’s reports are little to be trusted. 
We need not dive11 on the preliminaries of the battle. 
“ English battles and sieges in the Peninsula,” p. I 17. 
2 Idem, p. 1 1 0 .  
“Idem, p. 13s. 
Refutation, p. 111. 
Lumlcy reckoned them a t  somcthing less : but eight days before the battle 
the morning state of tliese three reginients showed r,iog troopers present under 
arms (Lettcr, pp. a j  and 32). 
6 Letter, p. zS. 
7 Letter, p. 26. 
8 The. plan is taken, so far as the features of the ground are concerned, from 
a reconnaissance sketch by Captains Solis and Burriel, of the Spanish staff, 
published in La Asnmblen deZ q k d f o  for 1858. Unfortunately, the contours are 
not figured. The letters used to mark the position of the troops correspond with 
those in the plan attached to D’Urban’s report. This was prepared by Major 
(afterwards Sir T. L.) AIitchell, and is from the same original as that published by 

































conical hill which was the highcst point of the ridge,‘ and was regarded 
as the key of the position. 
The  right, nu’, was‘commanded by the height z,* which became 
eventually the battle-ground; but the end, i, of the spur which runs cast- 
,yard from z is described by Beresford3 as a round hill considerably lower 
than the ridge itself. On this hill three Spanish battalions were placed 
in the early morning as pnrt of the original order of battle. To the south 
of the height z there was ‘‘a decpish valley of about qoo or 500  yards in 
breadth,” separating it from the hill y, and the continuation of the ridge, 
Ivhich rises towards Almendral. 
At 9 a.m. two brigades-onc British and one Portuguese-of the 
4th (Cole’s) Division reached the field of battle. The French were 
then just opening their attack. ‘ They had hitherto been concealed by the 
1voods;and part of their infantry had only come up in the middle of the 
night, having marched 8 leagues. Godinot’s brigade of 4,000 mcn4, 
accompanied by ten guns and some light cavalry, and folloivcd by WerlC‘s 
brigade of about the same strength, advanced from the south-east upon 
the village of Albuera (11). Soon afteril-ards the 5th Corps, which was 
massed behind a spur at  3, crossed the stream 2 miles above the village, 
and mounted thc slope of the ridge bcyoncl thc right of the allies. 
T h e  two divisions of the corps were fornied one behind the other in 
close columns of battalions. They were accompanied by the bulk of the 
artillery, which was planted on the hill y. The  heavy cavalry were on 
their left flank, and were soon joined by some of the light cavalry, making 
3,500 horsemen in all. WcrlBs brigade, changing its direction, follon-ed 
after them as a reserve (with the exception of one battalion), and the rest 
of the guns were brought up, leaving only one battery of horse artillery 
with G o d i ~ o t . ~  In  half-an-hour, as Napier says, or nearly an hour, as 
Bcresford reckons it: thc great mass of thc French army was established 
on thc ridge upon lleresford’s right, and hoped to roll up the allics, to cut 
off their rctrcat by the Valverde road, and throw them back on Badajoz. 
To meet this flank attack, Bcresford, on the first symptoms of it, told 
the Spanish general, Blake, to form his front line upon z, at right angles 
to his original line, extending his left along the spur towards the river, and 
drawing men, if need be, from his second line, the remainder of which 
would take up the ground left by the first line.’ Stewart’s division was 
ordered to form the second line of the new position, and was itself 
replaced by the Portuguese.. Cole’s division, which was in column on 
THE BATTLE OF ALBUERA. 
1 Further Strictures, p. I I j. 
* D’Urban, Report, p. 31. 
Further Strictures, p. I 14. 
4 Justification, p. 23. 
5 Laphe,  “Conquete de l’Andalousie,” p. 15-14. He was an artillery officer, 
and belonged to the 2nd Division of the 5th Corps. 
Thicrs speaks of an hour of inaction after the 
stream was crossed. 
7 In Beresford’s report it was stated by mistake that the new front was to be 
formed by part of the first and all the second line of Spaniards, and Napicr 
followed t l k  (Refutation, p. I jl). 
Fiirther Strictuses, p. 131. 































TIIE nATTLE OF ALnUERh. 906 
the  Badajoz road, was placed obliquely in rear of the right at d. to form a 
reserve for the right and centre, cover the right flank and the Iralverde 
road, and support the cavalry on this flank. This cavalry consisted of 
about 1,500 men, half British, half Spanish,l with four 6-pounclers, 
R.H.A., drawn up behind the A r o p  de Valdesevilla, which was dry or 
nearly so at the time, but had worn a deep channel. 
Owing to Blake’s delay, Beresford had to form up the Spanish troops 
himself on the new front “ i n  a much more hurried manner than was 
desirable,” and partly under the fire of the enemy’s sharpshooters.* nut 
h e  denied Napier’s statement that he  could not get the Spaniards 
suficiently forward to make room for Stewart’s division to support them. 
He says the Spanish line was on the very brow of the ridge, and “had  it 
gone another yard to the front, it must have gone down the steep of the 
hill.” The  French came fieyxly on in three strong columns, but halted 
immediately below the Spanish line, and nearly at the foot of the steep 
descent upon which it was placed ; and in spite of their fire, and that of 
the guns on the hill behind them, “ the Spanish line stood with great 
firmness more than an hour -and-a-half.” Then the Spaniards, having 
lost about I ,  joo men, began to crowd in groups behind each other. and 
he  ordered up the second This second line had been formed up in 
rear for some time, and had by mistake fired upon the first line, while 
Beresford himself was between the tmo.* 
Napier’s account, as it originally stood, was that the French attack 
‘‘ put the Spaniards in disorder at  all points ; in a short time, the latter 
gave way.” In  its later form it is rather less definite : “ the  Spaniards, 
falling fast, drew back.”j I n  his Justification he  said (p. 32): “ T h e  
story of the Spanish resistance is a Spanish romance.” 
The  evidence for it, confirmed as it is by Inglis, who comhanded the 
57th, is too good to be dismissed in this summary way, and four hours of 
hard fighting have somehow to be accounted for. But this evidence 
applies only to the left or centre of the line, where Beresford himself was. 
On the right the French were more successful. L a p h e  says that on the 
first attack the right of the allies was drawn back in some disorder, and 
four regiments of cavalry were sent forward to charge it. D’Urban’s 
account is that “ the Spaniards made a gallant and obstinate resistance, 
but were at length obliged to yield their ground upon which the enemy 
took post,” commanding the riglit of the position.G This was at  an early 
stage of the battle, before Stewart’s division had come up. T h e  head of 
it (Colborne’s brigade) arrived immediately afterwards, and at  once 
attacked to recover the ground. 
But if the French reached the top of the height, they ’did not 
1 Refutation, p. 128, and Letter, p. 32., 
Further Strictures, p. ljj- 
Further Strictures, pp.~jj-jS.  
4 Refutation, p. 213. 
5 English Battles, etc., 1’. 113. 
6 Report, p. 30. Beresford said thc sarnc in his original report, though Iic 































THE BATTLE OF ALIIUERX. 907 
remain there. Hardingc says :-“ The first brigade (Colbornc\s) when 
they had p i n e d  the crest of the hill, found it so hot that Stewart ordered 
a charge, ivhich the Buffs and 48th alone made in line against the enemy’s 
column of at lcast IO,OOO men. Fortunately the 3rst, being the left 
regiment, had not had time to deploy when the two other regiments 
charged ;I it  thereforc held the ground while Houghton’s- brigade 
deplayed in the rear, and under cover, and moved up to the support of 
the 3 1st.”* D’Urban attributes the disaster which bcfel Colbornc’s 
brigade (except the 31st), from the sudden charge of the French light 
cavalry on its right rear, not to its delay in deploying (as Napicr does), but 
to Stewart’s refusal of Colbornc’s request that the right wing of one 
regiment should be kept .in co lu~nn .~  The  result was not only the 
destruction of tho brigade, but the temporary capture of six guns. 
Houghton’s brigade-the third briggdc of Stewart’s division-was 
composed of the ~ 9 t h ~  57th, and 48th (first battalion). Inglis. colonel of 
the 57th, says:--"The whole division moved from its ground in open 
column of companies right in front, about a mile, where the line was to 
be formed on the leading company. At this period the Spaniards w r c  
warmly engaged with the enemy, and were behaving most gallantly. 
General Stewart’s division mas brought up to support them and to form 
the second line. After the 29th and thc right wing of the 57th formed, a 
body of French lancers got between tlie two These were some 
of the lancers who had been making havoc with Colborne’s brigade, and 
one of them now assailed Ileresford himself. A body of Spaniards who 
had given way and were being f o l l o \ d  by these lancers tried to break 
through the ranks of the 29th. That regiment was obliged to throw back 
two companies to guard its right flank and to open fire on Spaniards and 
lanccrs alikc. The  latter were soon driven off, and the Spaniards were 
then allowed to pass to the rear? The  fire begun upon the right, 
travelled along the line, and was taken up by the 57th, in front of whom 
the Spaniards were still holding their ground ; but the latter (Inglis says) 
did not suffer from this fire, as, owing to their position on the hill, thc 
balls passed over their heads.G 
When the Spaniards gave way here also Houghton’s brigade, now 
fully deployed, was ordered up to relieve the 31st. 
brigade (the second), consisting of the z8th, 3411, and 39th regiments 
came up on the left of it.’ Inglis says :-‘I The Spaniards retired very 
rapidly, and when our front was clear we were close to the enemy 
(perhaps) within 100 paces.” The  regiment then opened a very heavy, 
well-directed fire, by files from the right of companies. H e  adds that 
He overlooked the &thJ which also belonged to the brigade, and took part 
in tlie charge. 
Quoted by Napicr (Justification, p. 29) as the version wliicli I I C  had adopted. 
Furthcr Stricturcs, 11. 159, footnote. 
Refutation, p. 213. 
Justification, p. 30, and Everard’s 6‘ History of the 29th 12eginicnt.” 
Refutation, p. 213. 
Ueresford says they were in line (Further Strictures, p. 177)) but Hardingc 
Abercrombie’s . 































908 THE n x r T m  OF ALIIUERA. 
‘‘ the French never did ascend the heights or attempt it.’, But thrce- 
fourths of the ‘ I  Die-hards,” including Inglis himself, fell where they 
stood undpr the French fire. 
D n  the extreme right the state of the battle ivas even more critical. 
Many men of the 29th had used up all their ammunition,‘ and “ the  
c n e m y s s  enabled to lodge one of his columns, which he  had constantly 
fed from his reserves, rather forwarder than he  had hitherto done.” * 
Bcresford, who had by this time gone to the right, I‘ saw how advisable 
it was that an attack should be made upon that flank of the enemy ; and, 
finding several Spanish battalions in column to the rear, he exerted every 
mode of authority and persuasion to induce them to descend the hill and 
to make the desired charge.” It was here that he  seized a Spanish 
officer and dragged him to the front-an incident which Napier has put 
earlier in the day. Finding all in vain he sent off for a Portuguese 
brigade, and as it did not come he  went off himself to the rear to bring 
up  what troops he  could? 
He was the more impatient for them because he observed that the 
4th Division ivas in movement, and this caused him great anxiety. H e  
had given Cole strict orders not to leave the position in which he  had 
been placed without his special instructions. H e  relied on this division, 
in combination with Lumley’s cavalry, to keep the French cavalry in 
check ; and both at the time and afterwards he considered that its 
advance was an  error which might have proved d i sa s t ro~s ,~  though he  
praiscd it in his report. 
Napier ascribes the advance of Cole’s division to Hardingc, who was 
deputy-quartermaster-gene1 of the Portuguese Army, though only twcnty- 
five years of age. Originally he  wrote :-I‘ Colonel Hardinge boldly 
ordered Cole to advance.” A correspondence took place on the subject 
in thc Utrifed Service i7fagazit:e (IS.+O-I),J and in later editions h e  said 
that Hardinge, using Beresford’s name, had urged Cole. But crcn this is 
not borne out by the correspondence. Sir Henry Ilardingc attributed 
more weight to the advice which he, an officer of Bcresford’s staff fresh 
from the scene of action, vehemently pressed, than Sir Loivry Cole was 
i d l i n g  to give it, as affecting the responsibility of the divisional general. 
But there was no suggestion on either side that Hardinge had rcprc- 
scnted himself as acting in any sense ‘ I  by order.” Cole had already 
sent an aide-de-camp to Beresford for instructions, but he was wounded. 
At length, getting no orders, and convinced of the desperate state of the 
battle, he took the responsibility on himself of attacking the Frcnch in 
flank.6 ‘ I  The movement its.clf,” h e  says, ‘ I  was hazardous and difficult 
. 
* Justification, p. 20. 
* D’Urban’s report, p. 32. 
a Further Strictures p. 167. ’ Rcfutation p. 230. 
It consists of  eight letters from Colonel Wade (A.D.C. to  Cole), Colonel 
They were afterwards reprinted 
Hardinge times this as one and a half hours after the disaster t o  Colborne’s 
Napier, Sir H. Hardinge, and Sir Lowry Cole. 
































THE RATTLE OF ALTIUERA. 909 
to execute without exposing the right flank of the Fusilicrs to an 
acknowledged great superiority of cavalry, ready to take advantage of any 
error that might ot5ur. In  moving forward to the attack the Fusiliers 
advanced in echelons of battalions from the left, a manocuvre always 
dificult to perform correctly even in a common field-day; and as the 
Portuguese b r igde  in advancing had two objects to effect, namely, to 
shorn front to the enemy's cavalry and a t  the same time to preserve its 
distance from and cover the right flank of the Fusilier brigade, its move- 
ment was even more dificult to effect than the former. Thinking it 
desirable (with all due confidence in the Portuguese brigade) to have 
some British troops on the extreme right of the position, I directed the 
light companies of the Fusilicr brigidc to form in column on the right of 
the Portuguese, where I also placed the brigade of guns [Hawker's six 
9-pounders], and sent the Lusitanian.legion to the left of the Fusi!icrs." 
The  Fusilicr brigadc-7th (1st battalion), 7th (2nd battalion), 23rd 
(1st battalion), counting from left to right-numbered 1,500 rank and file; 
the Lusitanian legion about 750 light infantry ; and the two regiments of 
Earvey's Portugucsc brigade something over 2,000.~ 
Colonel Harvey, in his journal written that day, described the 
advancc2:--"The ~ 3 r d  and one battalion of the 7th Fusiliers w r c  in 
line. The  other battalion at quarter distance, forming square at every 
halt, to cover the right which the cavalry continued to menace. Major- 
General Lumley with the British cavalry was also in column of half- 
squadrons in rear of.our right and mowd with us, being too weak to 
advance against thc enamy's cavalry." These precautions cxplain how 
the Fusiliers escaped the fate of Colborne's brigade. One attempt the 
French cavalry did make, and it is said that the right of the Fusilicrs was 
partially broken, but the horsemen were driven off by a volley from the 
Por t~guese .~  
Hardinge says : - I c  The  instant Cole's division was in nioyemcnt and 
his left brigade approached the right of Houghton's, I went to Abcr- 
crombie's brigade, and authorised him to deploy. and move past 
Houghton's left. While Houghton's brig& held the hill, Myers and 
Abercrombic passed the flanks on the right and left, and made n simul- 
taneous attack on the enemy, who began to waver and then nent off to 
the rear." 4 
How the battle looked from the French side is described by Laphe ,  
who probably watched it from the hilly. After mentioning the retirement 
of the Spaniards on the right and the success of the French cavalry 
against Colborne's brigade, he says that the right kas  seen to be forming 
hastily in squares ; alIuding, no doubt, to the action of the 29th in 
throwing back two companies. This convinced both Soult and Girard 
(who was in temporary command of the 5th corps) that the n 11' ies meant 
to retreat. Girard determined to pnsh on and attack them at once; so, 
Refutation, p. 120. 
Cole, 'I Peninsular Generals," i., 2SG ; and D'Urbnt~, Report, p. 35. 
* Letter, p. 31. 































010 TIIE ILITZTTLE OF ALIIUEKA. 
without waiting to deploy, he  advanced with thc 5th ,corps in  close 
column-a fatal iniprudcncc. This mistake and their own numbers gave 
the allies an incalculable advantage. Bcresford moved up his second 
line and three rescrx  brigades. “Thcy calmly open a fire from two 
ranks, ~vell maintained and wcll aimed. Not a shot is lost in our close 
column, and it can only reply with the insufficicnt and ill-maintained fire 
of its two front ranks.” Thc  soldiers fell helplessly right and Icft, and 
the survivors lost hcart. Girard tried to dcploy and to take ground to 
his right, but it could not be tlonc under such a fire-there was neither 
room nor calmness cnough. The  result of this desperate position was a 
pronounced wavering, which soon became a rctrcat in disordcr. First 
the lcading regiment gavc way, having lost 600 men, thcn others folloacd 
in succession. The troops soon formcd a confuscd mass, which fell back 
pcll-niell, and onlj stopped on reaching their original position beyond 
the strcani. Soult ordcrcd up Werl6’s rcscrvc brigade to support Girard, 
but whilc the two regiments composing i t  were dcploying they wcrc 
thrown into some confusion by the4ugitivcs of the 5th corps. R’evcrthe- 
less it stood for somc time, and eventually retired, aftcr losing heavily, in 
bettcr order than the 5th corps. l‘hc artillcry and cavalry then rctircd 
too. 
There is some discrepancy in the accounts as to the Frcnch forma- 
tion. One division of the 5th corps  as behind the othcr, and  L a p h c  
says they were CR colonires serrtes j n r  batnilfons. Thc  authors of the 
“ Victoires, ConquCtcs, ctc., des Franpis,” whose account in the main 
agrees closely with Laphe’s, say that each divisiori was j l o y d e  e n  colotirre 
serrde j n r -  r&in~eiz ! .~  Home spcaks of them as in miss of close coluinns 
of double conipaiiics,2 but that would be described as serrtk j a r  divisioms. 
Thc accounts may bc best reconciled by assuming that, as was the case 
witl! D’Erlon’s corps at Watcrloo, each column consisted of cleploycd 
battalions one bchind another, but that the thrcc battalions of each 
regiment ivcre side by side, so that tlicrc mere thrcc contignous columns. 
130th Dcrcsford say therc were thrcc coluinns of attack, 
with 4,000. to j,ooo mcn in each, according to the latter; while Hardingc 
speaks of one column of at  least IO,OOO men. The regiments, as wc 
have sccn, gavc way in succession from thc front ; which implies that the 
~vholc fiont was formed by oiic regiment. The depth of the columns on 
thc above assumption would be twenty-four ranks, and the front of cach 
would be about 100 yards; whilc the fircline of thc thrcc deployed 
British brigades which ultimately envclopcd them would bc thrcc- 
quarters of a mile. 
With an  audacity 
almost sublime he tells thc empcror : “ The  enemy left 11s the position 
we had takcn from him, and did not venture to attack us again.” He 
and D’Urban 
Not much is to be learnt from Soult’s report.6 
Tome, 20, p. 256, etc. 
Further Strictures, p. 1 j7. 
Report, p. 32. 
‘‘ ll’cllingtoii Dcspatches,” supplcnientary, vol. xiii., p.6j1, 































TIIE IIATTLE OF ALIIUERB. 91 I 
says he  had 18,000 men, including 3,000 horse. Ilc puts the loss of the 
Trench at 2,S06, and that of the allies at  nearly IO,OOO. ' Napier 
reckoned the French loss at  more, than S,ooo, and there is no reason to 
think he overstated it. 
'I'hc following is the return of killed, wounded, and missing in the 
British battalions, officers included :- 
The loss of the allies was under 7,000. 
66th 
- 
4th Division (Cole) nIyers 
Total .. .' 3933 
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